Scholars of international relations have long studied the factors that can lead to the outbreak of war. In the last century, the theory of realism has emerged as the prevalent school of thought in international relations discourse. Realists subscribe to the belief that states are unitary rational actors motivated by either self-preservation or self-aggrandizement.¹ This concept reinforces the dominant perception that portrays national leaders as narrow, selfish, and calculating. This paper, instead, argues that realist motivations alone do not provide a compelling explanation for states’ actions. This argument has implications for contemporary global governance when efforts are made to prevent a dispute from escalating to war. If legitimate grievances of states are not adequately addressed, then attempts to maintain peace are futile.

David A. Welch, in his book Justice and the Genesis of War, provides an alternative explanation to the dominant realist account of the motivations for war. He argues that national leaders are often motivated by concerns other than, or in addition to, self-preservation or self-aggrandizement under certain circumstances. He asserts they are often incentivized by normative concerns, resulting in behaviour inconsistent with self-interest.² Welch examines the effect of a particular type of normative concern known as the justice motive. The justice motive is defined as the “drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits.”³ Agents that feel as though they have been aggrieved may behave in a manner that is contrary to realist theory. He examines the agency of the justice motive in the outbreak of five Great Power wars,⁴ to probe the plausibility of several hypotheses about the role of the justice motive on state behaviour.⁵

The justice motive has led to a series of miscalculations and misinterpretations that cause states to behave in ways that are contrary to their national interests. However, the book leaves questions unanswered regarding the implications of the justice motive: Whose perception of injustice has a greater impact in shaping the policies of the state, that of its leaders or the public? What is the effect of the justice motive on contemporary international politics? When the outcome of a peace settlement leaves one state with a perception of injustice, what can be done on an international level to prevent another war? This paper will attempt to answer these questions and their broader implications for conflict management in contemporary global governance.

Prior to discussing strategies aimed at mitigating the risk of war when perceptions of injustice are engaged, policymakers must first consider whose perception of injustice precipitates a state’s decision to declare war—that of its leaders or the public. At the onset of the Crimean War, the public’s opinion had varying levels of influence on the calculations of each state. In Russia, Tsar Nicholas was an autocrat, and his individual decisions were the only determinant of state policy. He was not accountable to a domestic constituency and did not rely on the advice of others when making decisions.⁶ His perception of injustice was engaged by a perceived violation of his rights to protect the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, which was his primary driving factor for engaging in war.⁷ In the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte (the central government) struggled to resist the opinion of its public, which overwhelmingly supported war due to the perceived injustices committed by the Russian Tsar in claiming a right of protection over the Orthodox Church and occupying sovereign Ottoman territory.⁸ Sultan Abdulmecid was also an autocrat but as the Ottoman Empire was unstable in the eighteenth century, public opinion held considerably more sway. The Sultan and his ministers understood the strategic considerations of the situation and resisted declaring war until diplomatic options were exhausted.⁹ In Britain, the Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen notably abhorred war and sought to avoid it entirely. This position was at odds with British public opinion, which was overwhelmingly opposed to the Russian Tsar's demands in regards to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Clarendon acknowledged the limitations felt by the cabinet, confessing that “our pacific policy is at variance with public opinion so it cannot long be persisted in.”¹¹ This statement emphasizes the contradiction in Britain between the policy of its government and the opinion of its public. To determine which perception of injustice was the greater driving factor–that of the national leaders or the public–it is necessary to examine the political composition of each state. In this context, it can be concluded that in authoritarian states, the leader’s perception of injustice is often the sole determinant of foreign policy. Similarly, in states where there exists some form of democracy, the public’s perception of justice exercises a greater influence over foreign policy. This distinction is an important consideration for an institution having to mediate between two states in a dispute as it must be first determined whether the intransigence in a state’s behaviour is motivated by its leaders or public.

While Welch establishes the agency of the justice motive in a historical context, his argument can be extended upon to discuss the implications of the justice motive on contemporary global politics. For instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains conflicting and incompatible perceptions of injustice based on historical right and self-determination. Israelis and Palestinians have clung to two competing narratives regarding who is entitled to the sovereign territory within the state of Israel. According to Palestinians, the Jewish settlers invaded and seized the country from the Palestinians, who were then disposed of and displaced.¹² According to Israelis, the land historically belonged to the Jews, which is why they gathered their exiles there to establish the Jewish state.¹³ Both Israelis and Palestinians firmly believe that the land belongs to them by right. For hard-line supporters of each side in the conflict, any outcome other than complete sovereignty over the disputed territory is considered unacceptable. Welch states that an agent’s demand for justice can only be resolved by rectifying the perceived discrepancy between its entitlements and benefits.¹⁴ The heightened emotions of public opinion on both sides make it particularly difficult for leaders to peacefully resolve the conflict. Even in the past, when a solution seemed within reach, such as the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, internal divisions within both groups derailed the agreement.¹⁵ It is these enduring perceptions of injustice on both sides of the conflict that has sustained the conflict for seven decades. 

The justice motive has broader implications for the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means in contemporary global politics. When an agent feels aggrieved, it impedes cooperation, increasing the propensity for future conflict. This makes it important to ensure that the peace settlement concluding a conflict is accepted by both sides. This was not the case in the Treaty of Frankfurt am Main, which left France with a sense of injustice at being stripped of its provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Welch states that the German possession of Alsace and Lorraine was the determining factor in France’s relations with Berlin prior to the First World War. This made any further German attempt to improve relations a hopeless endeavor and ultimately contributed to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance.¹⁶ Similarly, the Germans viewed the Treaty of Versailles as an unjust settlement that placed the responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War on Germany via the infamous “war guilt” clause.¹⁷ While Germans were divided ideologically, economically, socially, and politically in the years following the war, they were in agreement on the issue of foreign affairs. Welch argues that Adolf Hitler’s passionate assault on the peace settlement in public meetings attracted a loyal following and bolstered his public image.¹⁸ Germans believed he could reverse the great injustice of the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁹ These two cases place importance on an international institution with sufficient credibility to mediate disputes between states with competing perceptions of justice. The only present institution with such capabilities is the United Nations, but the function of the organization makes it susceptible to the motivations of other states, particularly those with direct interests pertaining to the dispute between the two aggrieved parties. Any mediating institution must evaluate the competing claims of states on their merits and have no disposition towards bias. 

Welch struggles to distinguish the justice motive from the realist motivation of self-interest in certain chapters. This is explained by the fact that most entitlements that an agent perceives belong to them by right are often material in nature. Welch acknowledges that there is no necessary contradiction between the two motivations, which further complicates any attempt to separate them into distinct categories.²⁰ The Falklands War is one of two conflicts that Welch attributes completely to agency of the justice motive.²¹ He explains that the motivations of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to retake the islands were a result of the requirements of justice, where the Argentinian invasion constituted a blatant violation of the Falkland Islander’s right to self-determination. Welch dismisses arguments that attribute the Prime Minister’s motivations to credibility, which entails that Britain capitulating to Argentinian demands would have sent a signal to the world that she was unwilling to defend her possessions and maintain her commitments.²² Welch argues this on the basis that Thatcher would avoid retreating publicly from her insistence on maintaining British sovereignty over the islands in her proposal to the United Nations, as this was counterintuitive to her determination not to allow aggression to be rewarded.²³  However, this argument fails to acknowledge that diplomatic proposals up until the beginning of fighting were rejected by Thatcher, who felt that they were attempts to obfuscate by the Argentine government.²⁴ Welch also fails to acknowledge the potential discrepancy that often exists between a politician’s public stance and private deliberations. Thatcher may have publicly described British motivations as a moral obligation to defend self-determination, which would have been convenient given that public opinion in the country was divided on the issue.²⁵ But this contradicts what Thatcher thought privately, as she writes in her memoir, “And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister.”²⁶

Overall, Justice and the Genesis of War by David A. Welch effectively establishes the agency of justice as a normative concern impacting the behavior of states leading up to war. It challenges the dominant realist account of motivation based on either self-aggrandizement or self-preservation. By examining the agency of the justice motive in the outbreak of five Great Power wars, in specific contexts realism alone fails to provide a convincing account of motivations. However, there is disagreement regarding to what extent the justice motive and other normative motivations are responsible for conditioning and triggering a conflict. In the nearly three decades since the original publishing of the book, there continues to be a lack of scholarship in the field of international relations on the agency of the justice motive and other normative motivations in the analysis of the causes of war. This reveals a pressing underlying issue in contemporary global politics. By treating realist motivations as a constant in explaining the behavior of states, scholars are approaching conflict resolution counterintuitively. Without an accurate understanding of the concerns motivating states, it increases the propensity for misjudgements and miscalculations, making it more difficult to address those concerns. The failure to determine the causes of war makes it impossible to establish a lasting peace.

Anthony Popov is a first-year undergraduate student aspiring to double major in international relations and history. His interests include studying the evolution of war and diplomacy and its impact on the current geopolitical landscape of Europe.

1. David Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3.
2. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 18.
3. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 19.
4. These Great Power wars are the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, the First World War, the Second World War, and the Falklands War.
5. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 19.
6. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 63.
7. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War 63-65.
8. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War 68.
9. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 68.
10. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 71-72.
11. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War 71.
12. Mohammed S.Dajani Daoudi and Zenia M. Barakat, “Israelis and Palestinians: Contested Narratives,” Israel Studies 18, no. 2 (2013): 57.
13. Dajani Daoudi and Barakat, “Israelis and Palestinians,” 57.
14. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 19.
15. Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (2005): 727-28.
16. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 102.
17. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 128.
18. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 135-36.
19. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War 135.
20. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 20.
21. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War 186.
22. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 178-79.
23. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 183.
24. Stephen Benedict Dyson, Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy: Margaret Thatcher’s Black-and-White Thinking, International Political Science Review 30, no. 1 (2009): 41
25. Welch, Justice and The Genesis of War, 180.
26. Dyson, Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy, 40.