A radical change or the continuation of the status quo – which road will be taken? Will this traffic light turn green, red, or stay in an unsettled yellow? These are the questions many are asking as a new German government composed of the Social Democratic Party, the Free Democratic Party, and Alliance 90/The Greens in a so-called “traffic light coalition” enters office – especially in terms of its upcoming policies towards China. Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock face a series of important questions with regards to this global power as they enter federal office, including a boycott of the Olympic Games, the guaranteeing of democracy in Hong Kong and human rights in Xinjiang, as well as the continuation of strong bilateral trade and industry relations.¹ With an alliance whose coalition agreement is entitled “Dare More Progress – An Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Sustainability”, how will the new government change the cordial and trade-based China relations so strongly advocated for under Merkel?²

Under the chancellorship of Angela Merkel, it is widely agreed upon that foreign policy, especially towards China, was not dictated by the Foreign Office, but rather directly by the Chancellery, and the policy was one of path dependency – a prioritization of economic prosperity for both nations.³ This policy came at the expense of a substantive public debate on key human rights issues, which many of Germany’s allies and most Germans themselves may have sought a stronger stance on. This policy of cordial economic prosperity is one the Chinese hope to see continued. Foreign office spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that “the new German government will continue the pragmatic and balanced policy toward China, toward the same direction and … mutual benefit.”⁴

Olaf Scholz is seen as a Chancellor willing to promote the continuation of these Merkel-era policies. In his Social Democratic Party’s electoral program, China was only mentioned in a single paragraph, and foreign policy as a whole took a backseat during the campaign.⁵ While the “Program for the Future” acknowledges a rising number of conflicts of interest and values with China as well as human rights violations in Xinjiang, it specifies China’s importance on the world stage and as an economic partner that is on the rise. Thus, a constructive dialogue remains central to Germany-China relations.⁶ This lack of willingness by the SPD and, by extension, Scholz to take a firm stance against China leads many to believe that his China policy will be virtually unchanged from the one pursued by the previous federal government.

China, however, features heavily in the party program of Alliance 90/The Greens, the party that now controls the foreign ministry and may herald a much tougher German and broader European stance on China. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is known to champion a “value-based foreign policy” and strongly criticizes China’s human rights record.⁷ This sentiment is reflected in the Green party’s overall stance: strongly prioritizing human rights and an active climate policy, while wanting to use Germany’s soft power to advance these issues rather than to continue safeguarding strong bilateral trade. The program directly singles out China as “Europe’s competitor, partner and systemic rival.⁸ While constructive dialogue is the preferred option, the program does discuss the need for “clear countermeasures” for areas where China would be less willing to cooperate.⁹

The natural question that arises from the comparison of these two drastically different platforms is which of them will prevail: Scholz’s economic pragmatism or Baerbock’s value-based approach? Analyzing the text of the coalition agreement on China, it is clearly stated that the new government is concerned about human rights violations and action must be taken.¹⁰ At the same time, it is further highlighted that communication and cooperation with China is the basis of all action.¹¹ The agreement further indicates the need for a joint European policy on China, a point repeatedly stated by Minister Baerbock since her assumption of office, as well as transatlantic cooperation on the West’s approach to China. However, the agreement does not specify the introduction of direct sanctions or any other punitive measures against China in consequence of its human rights violations.¹² Thus, it can be concluded that coalition talks between the new parties in government have not yet led to a clear joint position towards China. There exists a lack of consensus in terms of what substantive measures should be taken in response to China’s growing international relevance and, to an extent, aggression. However, it should be noted that this is the first coalition agreement of any German government that explicitly mentions human rights as an area of concern.¹³

The stances taken by Scholz and Baerbock since they assumed office have continued this trend of disagreement between the coalition partners, as reflected in staffing decisions in senior Foreign Office and Chancellery positions. Furthermore, no clear statements of action on China have been made, despite the need to address a number of pressing concerns related to this global power. The most pressing issue – the possibility of a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics – was, however, diplomatically resolved with reference to China’s quarantine regulations, which made senior diplomatic representation to the Olympic games challenging and unfeasible.¹⁴ 

Since his inauguration, Scholz has maintained strategic ambiguity in relation to a clear stance on condemnations toward China, preferring to let the status quo hold its course. However, since taking office, Baerbock has continued to be just as outspoken as during the election campaign, expressively noting the lack of progress in terms of human rights and wanting to use Germany’s trade influence on China to bring about a real and lasting change.¹⁵ These statements come amidst assurances that there is no disagreement between Foreign Office and Chancellery in terms of policy towards China.¹⁶

As the German public grows more critical in its view towards China, even Germany’s industry is beginning to see the limitations on their longtime advocated policy of “transformation through trade”. How the government’s policy towards China will change in the long run will most likely be decided again in a struggle for pre-eminence between the Chancellery and the Foreign Office.¹⁷ Depending on the winner, we will see either a continuation of economic pragmatism or a harsher value-based foreign policy that features dialogue along with increased toughness.∇

Paul Meyer is a first-year Social Science Student planning to Double Major in International Relations and Public Policy with a Minor in Economics. A Franco-German having lived in China for eleven years, his academic interests are focused on China, the United Nations, and questions of power on the international stage.

1. Frederick Kleim, "The German Elections and Angela Merkel’s China Legacy," The Diplomat, October 13, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/the-german-elections-and-angela-merkels-china-legacy/.
2. German Bundestag, Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Freien Demokraten, and Bündnis 90 / Die Grunen, Mehr Fortschritt Wagen. Bündnis Für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit Und Nachhaltigkeit (Berlin, 2021): 1, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf.
3. Kleim, "The German Elections and Angela Merkel’s China Legacy.”
4. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on December 9, 2021,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wang Wenbin, last modified December 9, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202112/t20211209_10465086.html.
5. Bloomberg, "Germany’s Olaf Scholz Seals Coalition Deal to Become Next Chancellor," South China Morning Post, November 24, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3157234/germanys-olaf-scholz-seals-coalition-deal-succeed-angela-merkel?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3157234.
6. German Bundestag, Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Aus Respekt vor deiner Zukunft (Berlin, 2021): 60, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Programm/SPD-Zukunftsprogramm.pdf.
7. German Bundestag, Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen, Deutschland. Alles ist drin. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2021 (Berlin, 2021): 228, https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/Wahlprogramm-DIE-GRUENEN-Bundestagswahl-2021barrierefrei.pdf. 
8. German Bundestag, Deutschland, 228.
9. German Bundestag, Deutschland, 228.
10. German Bundestag, Mehr Fortschritt Wagen, 157.
11. German Bundestag, Mehr Fortschritt Wagen, 157.
12. German Bundestag, Mehr Fortschritt Wagen, 157.
13. "A New Foreign Policy for Germany?" German Council on Foreign Relations | DGAP, Christian Möllin, Tyson Barker, Tim Rühlig, Serafine Dinkel, and Leonie Stamm, last modified November 25, 2021. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/new-foreign-policy-germany.
14. Annalena Baerbock, "Werte und Interessen sind kein Gegensatz," Die Zeit, December 21, 2021, https://www.zeit.de/2021/53/annalena-baerbock-aussenpolitik-russland-china. 
15. Baerbock, “Werte und Interessen sind kein Gegensatz.“
16. "Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock im Interview mit der dpa," interview by Deutsche Presse Agentur, Auswärtiges Amt, December 22, 2021, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/-/2504192.
17. Lily McElwee, "Will Germany Depart from the Merkel Model on China? Beijing Will Have a Say," The Diplomat, December 15, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/will-germany-depart-from-the-merkel-model-on-china-beijing-will-have-a-say/; Bloomberg, "In Germany, Hamburg is at the Heart of a Growing Dilemma over China," South China Morning Post, October 24, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3153479/germanys-likely-new-leader-olaf-scholz-hamburg-centre-growing?module=hard_link&pgtype=article.