From Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the 1980s to Xi Jinping’s assertive foreign policy in the 2010s, China has experienced remarkable economic growth, emerging as a power poised to confront the status quo. Crucial to the ongoing scholarly debate about the implications of China’s rise is nationalism. Accordingly, I will answer the following question: how does resurgent Chinese nationalism threaten the stability of the US-dominated world order? Analyzing Benedict Anderson’s “official nationalism,” this paper will demonstrate that, based on Power Transition Theory, Chinese state-fabricated nationalism threatens the current world order by distorting perceived power and diminishing satisfaction with the status quo. 

In his seminal work, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson traces nationalism from its origins in the decline of dynasties to its global proliferation and mutation. One crucial development occurred in the mid-nineteenth century as large heterogeneous empires employed nationalism to unify otherwise disparate populations.¹ Anderson describes this phenomenon as “official nationalism,” which originated as a reaction by ancien régimes to the revolutionary nationalisms that had proliferated in Europe since the 1820s.² Official nationalism was typically self-protective, aimed at preserving waning imperial-dynastic interests.³ Anderson identifies three factors that indicate a predisposition to official nationalism: ethnocultural homogeneity, a rich history, and a perceived outside threat.⁴ Ethnocultural homogeneity makes the creation of an imagined community far easier, as a shared vernacular and identity allow individuals to relate themselves to others. An outside threat enables leaders to rally a politically-aware population behind the notion of self-defence.⁵ Lastly, states with a “glorious” past can reach into the historical grab bag and construct a narrative that appeals to nationhood. Together, these three factors culminate in an “us against them” scenario and create a strong sense of national identity. Although the dynastic realm has long passed, official nationalism persists as states continue to fabricate self-serving nationalism: no longer propping up crumbling regimes, but fortifying nationalist enterprises and their imperial ambitions. Nationalism has been a dominant force in international relations since rearing its head in the likes of Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and as I will demonstrate, post-Mao China. Nationalism’s role in several international conflicts, such as WWI and WWII, warrants careful observation. By applying Anderson’s framework, we can better understand rising powers that employ state-fabricated nationalism.

Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, Deng Xiaoping implemented a propaganda campaign with the aim of fomenting nationalism and party loyalty.⁶ This attempt at employing “official nationalism” to regain party control was remarkably successful, and China has since experienced a resurgence of nationalist sentiment. The successful proliferation of nationalism can be partially attributed to the factors identified by Anderson. With about ninety-three percent of its population being Han Chinese, China is a relatively homogenous nation that was subjected to frequent foreign intervention during what is known as the “century of humiliation.” This period was articulated by several “unequal treaties” in which China signed away territory along its coast to Western powers. As Suisheng Zhao notes, almost all Chinese leaders since this period have felt bitterness over China’s humiliation and developed nationalist ideologies as a result.⁷ The century of humiliation was a focus of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda campaign: constructing a narrative of Chinese history as a relentless struggle against foreign intervention whilst promoting national unity in the face of separatist movements.⁸ In addition to frequent foreign intervention and ethnic homogeneity, China has a history of being a supreme global power, envisioning itself as the “middle kingdom.” The CCP has stressed this history, resulting in a China that is nostalgic of its glorious past.⁹ During this period, intellectuals within China suggested that nationalism would be “indispensable for advancing China’s national interests.”¹⁰ Given its susceptibility to official nationalism based on Anderson’s model, it is unsurprising that an ultranationalist sentiment has fomented in China in recent years. The emergence of nationalism becomes particularly concerning when considered with China’s remarkable economic success in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. In light of these two developments, scholars have engaged in a discourse seeking to establish whether Chinese nationalism threatens the current world order.

One theory many scholars have explored to help understand the implications of a rising China is Power Transition Theory (PTT). According to PTT, world politics is hierarchical in nature, with a “dominant” state at the top holding the largest proportion of power resources.¹¹ Of particular relevance to this paper is PTT’s analysis of conflict between states. The group below the dominant state are “great powers”: major states with a smaller proportion of power than the dominant state. There are two main factors that determine the likelihood that a great power will challenge the dominant power. First, the potential challenger’s power must reach approximately that of the dominant state. More significant than the exact power of the challenger is its perceived power relative to that of the dominant state. Second, a great power must desire to change the system established by the dominant state – that is, it must be dissatisfied with the status quo. Therefore, according to PTT, the highest probability for violent conflict occurs when a dissatisfied state reaches power parity with the dominant state.

In applying PTT to contemporary China, we can understand the likelihood of China challenging the current world order. Several scholars have explored the power parity component of PTT, forecasting China’s economic and military growth against the United States. Data regarding GDP growth provide evidence for the conclusion that, in economic terms, China will reach parity with the US.¹² However, this is not the full story. Several factors, such as aging demographics, large debts, and inherent inefficiencies related to China’s controlled economy, suggest that China’s growth may slow.¹³ Nevertheless, there appears to be consensus that China reaching economic parity with the US is no longer a question of if, but when. Whether or not this will translate to power parity is subject to debate; however, given the scope of this essay, it will be assumed that due to the speed of China’s growth and rising nationalist sentiment, China’s economic overtaking of the US will result in the perception of power parity. Therefore, it is China’s satisfaction that determines the probability of a violent conflict through a PTT analysis.

Scholars have approached quantifying satisfaction in several ways. Whereas some have assessed traditional political culture, soft power, congruence of domestic systems, or the travel patterns of high ranking officials, others have focused on military expenditures, participation in international institutions, and alliance portfolios.¹⁴ As Yves-Heng Lim recognizes, using these factors in combination provides a holistic account of a state’s satisfaction.¹⁵ For example, if a country engages with international institutions, allies with the dominant power’s bloc, and has relatively low military expenditures, this would indicate satisfaction with the current system. Conversely, high military spending, frequent exertion of soft power, and disengagement from international institutions indicate dissatisfaction. When we apply this model to China, the results are unclear. 

Although Lim correctly identifies that in nominal terms China’s military budget has increased twelvefold from 1994 to 2012, its spending as a proportion of total GDP has remained relatively unchanged since 2000.¹⁶ While China is a member of most international institutions, it has disregarded international rulings about the South China Sea and has created alternative institutions in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.¹⁷ Although officially communist, reformations since Deng Xiaoping have resulted in a socialist market economy compatible with capitalist systems. While Lim may argue that China exhibits characteristics of a dissatisfied great power, a holistic analysis offers a conflicted conclusion. However, when considering the forces of official nationalism, the result becomes far clearer.

Nationalism has implications for both satisfaction and perceived power. Although nationalism does not directly cause dissatisfaction per se, it does make it less likely for the state in question to be satisfied with the status quo, as nationalism demands glory. China’s nostalgia for its “glorious past” as the “middle kingdom” is incompatible with any world order in which China is not the dominant power. The realities of China’s subordinate role may conflict with ultra-nationalistic notions of inherent superiority.¹⁸ This tension can lead to dissatisfaction, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Additionally, nationalism may distort a state’s perceived power. As Jin Kai notes, nationalism evokes confidence in rising powers, leading them to take more assertive action.¹⁹ China’s ultra-nationalism and resulting assertive foreign policy in regional territorial disputes suggests an increase in their perceived power.²⁰ It is worth reiterating that China reaching power parity does not necessarily entail a violent conflict, so long as the dominant power is willing to make accommodations to ensure satisfaction. However, as demonstrated, nationalism threatens the potential of a nonviolent transition by bolstering state confidence and demanding restoration of national glory. In this way, Chinese nationalism threatens the stability of the current US-dominated international order.

By using Anderson’s framework to understand the origins of resurgent Chinese nationalism, it becomes apparent that nationalism leads to higher perceived power and lower satisfaction, therefore increasing the likelihood of a violent conflict. How should the international community respond? According to PTT, the dominant power should work to realign satisfaction, control regional flashpoints, and exert leverage during the early stages of the contender's rise.²¹ The United States recently announced NATO’s pivot towards China, demonstrating a willingness to use their leverage in the early stages of China’s growth.²² Counterbalancing China will require deep coordination between states; however, given the intensity of Chinese nationalism, this may still prove insufficient. Only time will tell whether the US and its allies will be able to manage China’s ascent.∇

Matthew Kieffer is in his third year of studies pursuing a double major in International Relations and Economics with a minor in Visual Studies. His research interests include geopolitics in East Asia, great power dynamics, and climate change. 

1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), 86.
2. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 86.
3. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 159.
4. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 95-96.
5. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 95-96.
6. Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2004), 9.
7. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 12.
8. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 9.
9. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 78.
10. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 10-11.
11. Jin Kai, Rising China in a Changing World Power Transitions and Global Leadership, (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017), 21.
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13. Minxin Pei, “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: A Play for Global Leadership,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 50.
14. Yves-Heng Lim, “How (Dis)Satisfied Is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 92 (March 4, 2015): 281, 284.
15. Lim, “How (Dis)Satisfied,” 284.
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17. Pei, “Global Leadership,” 41, 44.
18. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 290.
19. Kai, Rising China, 142.
20. Kai, Rising China, 142.
21. Kai, Rising China, 43.
22. Henry Ridgwell, “China, Russia Top NATO Agenda as US Seeks to Rebuild Transatlantic Bonds,” Voice of America, accessed April 1, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/usa/china-russia-top-nato-agenda-us-seeks-rebuild-transatlantic-bonds.